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NOTICE 
Are We Protecting the Wrong Rights? 
Jennifer L. Saulino* 
NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND 
THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE. By Elizabeth Bartha/et. Boston: 
Beacon Press. 1999. Pp. 304. Cloth, $28.50; paper, $17.50. 
Sabrina Green was found dead on November 8, 1997, at the age of nine 
years old. She was dead from untreated burns, gangrene and blows to her 
head which had fractured her skull. Her body was covered with sores, 
and the gangrene had spread through her right arm and hand, which was 
missing a thumb. In her final weeks of life she had been tied at night by 
the arms and legs to her bed to prevent her from stealing food, according 
to the half-sister who had been made her guardian . . . .  (p. 92] 
As horrific as Sabrina's death sounds, her life was even worse. 
Sabrina was born to a cocaine-abusing mother who abandoned her at 
birth. When her mother was found two months later, Sabrina was sent 
home to her. Her mother continued abusing cocaine and died three 
years later (p. 93). For the next five years Sabrina lived with a family 
friend. When the friend died, Sabrina's half-sister petitioned the court 
to become her guardian (p. 93). But Sabrina's sister had ten children 
of her own and had already been investigated for failing to care ade­
quately for them. The family court judge nevertheless approved the 
guardianship, because he only had limited information presented to 
him by the state agency. "Family members, neighbors, acquaintances, 
and school officials all realized later that Sabrina was in trouble. But 
no one intervened to prevent Sabrina's torture and death" (p. 93). 
Elizabeth Bartholet,1 in her book Nobody's Children , takes a 
strong step toward beginning a new kind of dialogue about abused and 
neglected children. She positions herself as a liberal who has come to 
terms with the fact that traditional liberal ideals are in conflict with the 
needs of abused and neglected children (p. 5). In doing so, she tries to 
convince her readers that, regardless of ideology, we all should have a 
* The author would like to thank Professor Don Duquette for invaluable comments and 
encouragement and the child clients of the Michigan Child Advocacy Clinic for showing me 
why this particular windmill is worth tilting at. 
1. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. 
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different focus in the area of child abuse and neglect law.2 She uses 
Sabrina as one of several examples of how programs for abused and 
neglected children that focus on keeping families and communities to­
gether, while well-intentioned, sometimes sacrifice the child. 
Bartholet's book, in that sense, is groundbreaking.3 
Bartholet's argument begins with the history and politics of child 
protection programs and presumptions in favor of parents. It moves to 
outlining the modern day problems and the impact of substance abuse 
on children. She continues by demonstrating the pervasiveness of the 
philosophies that drove the old programs. Her analysis and examples 
show that the shortcomings of old programs are also present in pro­
grams purportedly designed to reinvigorate the system. She criticizes 
what she calls the family preservation bias and uses examples and sta­
tistics to show that the bias is unwarranted and probably detrimental. 
Through this format, Bartholet challenges traditional ideologies by 
demonstrating that they have not worked. She then takes the bold step 
of introducing theories most are afraid to verbalize - like the idea 
that interracial adoption should be widely utilized and that the legal 
system should aggressively separate children from drug-abusing bio­
logical parents. But she could have gone further. 
All of Bartholet's arguments and evidence support the thesis that 
children have a constitutional right to be raised in a nurturing and 
loving environment - an environment that is in their best interests. 
This right would be a fully formed right equal to that of the parent to 
control the child's upbringing and guide her education. Thus, the law 
in this area should be focused on the conflict of rights and not, as it 
currently is, on the propriety of state interference on the parental 
right. Bartholet does not make that argument. She hints at it, and sup­
ports it, but does not defend it. She articulates her ultimate conclusion 
in the book as a need for a change in attitude and presents solutions 
such as more aggressive adoption and more state responsibility. 
Bartholet's book may seem radical, but her arguments do not take the 
debate in a new direction. They ultimately fall into the same child 
2. P.5. In discussing the case of Sabrina, Bartholet demonstrates the true conflicts of 
ideology faced by child advocates: "There has been an even greater reluctance to voice con­
cerns about the potentially corrupting influence of [money given to foster parents] in this 
context than in the non-kin foster context. One risks being considered not simply antipoor, 
but antifamily as well, and hostile to the black family in particular, since kinship care provid­
ers are disproportionately African-American." P. 92. 
3. See Martin Guggenheim, Somebody's Children: Sustaining the Family's Place in Child 
Welfare Policy, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1716, 1717 (2000) (book review) ("Nobody's Children is 
an unprecedented and extremely radical critique of child welfare practice. The book takes 
issue with the first principle of child welfare - that children should, whenever possible, re­
main with their biological families."). 
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abuse mold that is focused on arguing about the successes or failures 
of programs and policies.4 
This Notice advocates the redefinition of child law for which 
Bartholet lays the groundwork but ultimately never advocates herself. 
Part I presents the highlights of Bartholet's argument. Part II suggests 
that a thesis based on an articulation of ·child rights could provide the 
anchor that Bartholet's current proposals lack and points out weak­
nesses to both approaches. Part III demonstrates how a children's 
rights approach could provide a better platform for discussion of many 
problems facing this country's children. This Notice concludes that a 
constitutional rights approach to child law would provide sturdier sup­
port to Bartholet's policy proposals, and perhaps revitalize the entire 
field. 
I. BARTHOLET'S ARGUMENT 
Beginning early in the book with her historical overview and con­
tinuing throughout, Bartholet criticizes the "family preservation" 
mindset that has permeated child protection law for the last few dec­
ades. She argues that the "entire child-protection system was shaped 
by the family preservation priority" (p. 39). Enforcement of child­
protection laws was left, in the first instance, to child protection work­
ers charged with keeping families together. The basis in legal history 
for the assumption that children are property of their parents is long 
held.5 The family preservation movement came about because several 
writers in the 1970s and 1980s challenged the foster care system of that 
time by arguing that, while harm might come from emotional abuse or 
4. Compare Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 1733 (arguing that Bartholet's statistics are 
faulty based on one other researcher's studies and claiming that, "[t)o the extent that she 
believes children at serious risk of harm are left at home because of a widespread bias 
against removing them, she provides little evidence to support this claim"), with Elizabeth 
Bartholet, Reply: Whose Children? A Response to Professor Guggenheim, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 1999, 2002 (2000) ("Not only does Guggenheim ignore [the point that family preserva­
tion studies do not examine the children after families are 'preserved'], but his review exem­
plifies the problem I try to illuminate, as he too makes claims for the proven 'success' of 
family preservation programs in terms of their ability to prevent child removal."). The two 
authors resort to arguments over statistics rather than over the question of how actually to 
achieve some help for the children they both would protect. See Guggenheim, supra note 3, 
at 1750 ("Professor Bartholet and I may differ on exactly how the sentiments . . .  ought to be 
manifested, [but] we are in full accord on the importance of recognizing the risks inherent 'in 
continuing to abdicate any community responsibility for our nation's children - in continu­
ing to see the children suffering abuse and neglect as not belonging to all of us.") (quoting 
Bartholet, supra, at 243). 
5. See, e.g., Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 1743 (citing numerous cases): 
[T]he rights of Americans to choose their marital partner, to procreate, to keep custody of 
children, and to control the details of raising them are not accidentally or carelessly selected 
freedoms . . . . The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly underlie its 
specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a 
family are of a similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected. 
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severe neglect, "more harm would come to children in the end from 
incursions on family autonomy" (p. 39). In attacking the family pres­
ervation mindset, she emphasizes the need for reconceptualization of 
theory and attitude.6 She argues that we should focus on the state obli­
gation to protect children from abusive parents, not individual social 
agendas having nothing to do with children. We can do that by recog­
nizing that "parents who treat their children badly are themselves vic­
tims, and if we want to stop the vicious cycle, we need to create a soci­
ety in which there is no miserable underclass, living in conditions 
which breed crime, violence, substance abuse, and child maltreat­
ment" (p. 6). 
Bartholet moves on to criticize "politics" for the staying power of 
the family preservation ideology. She criticizes the left because they 
use the removal of children from their homes as a proxy for racial or 
class injustice (p. 45). She criticizes the right because they do not want 
the government interfering in their own parenting rights (p. 45). She 
then makes a connection that few would notice: the politics of the left 
and the right combine with the recent movement to reduce welfare 
spending. The combination sends a stream of money to the poverty­
stricken through the children. Thus, family preservation policies also 
provide a means of funding where welfare fails. Families that take 
more children get more money. Yvette Green, Sabrina's half-sister, 
took in Sabrina saying, "that she wanted to keep her family together 
and that she would need the additional welfare and medical benefits 
that would come with legal custody."7 
Abused and neglected children are disproportionately children of 
poorer parents.8 Family preservation policies keep the search for fos­
ter parents first within the extended family (satisfying the right) and 
then in the immediate neighboring community (satisfying the left) (p. 
47). Foster parents are paid a stipend. Bartholet demonstrates that as 
welfare funding has fallen in the last few years, arguments for child 
6. P. 122: 
Nor has there yet been any fundamental change in the mindset of most of those who make 
and implement child welfare policy - the judges who interpret and apply laws, the social 
workers who make decisions whether or not to remove children, the bureaucrats who run 
federal and state child welfare agencies, the private foundation administrators who have 
provided essential funding for family preservation programs, the not-for-profit agency peo­
ple involved in child welfare issues, and the lawyers who represent the parties in court, in­
cluding those assigned to represent children's interest. These people have enormous power 
to determine whether new laws and policies intended to change the system actually have any 
significant impact. 
7. P. 93 (quoting Joe Sexton & Rachel L. Swams, A Slide into Peril, with No One to 
Catch Her, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1997, at Al 7); see also supra note 2. 
8. P. 234. Bartholet disputes those who argue that the data is skewed and that child pro­
tection agencies simply do not focus on more wealthy parents. She presents other data 
showing these children really are more at risk. She also points out the risk factors for be­
coming an abusive parent are more often found in poorer, younger, single parents. 
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welfare programs have gained support. Her worry is that these funds 
are really just going through the back door to replace the money the 
government took out the front, and they are not providing more sup­
port for children. Bartholet thus realizes that an increased focus on 
child welfare may not mean increased resources for the actual chil­
dren.9 Yet, her conclusion to the chapter weakly suggests that liberals 
need to worry about children as much as the exploited groups they 
worry child protection policies harm, and that conservatives should 
see the cost-effectiveness of early intervention (p. 55). Here she dem­
onstrates a recurring penchant for suggesting through her evidence 
that she is heading toward a more fundamental change in thinking but 
failing to follow through. 
Bartholet demonstrates that recent attempts at creating new pro­
grams still promote traditional ideals (Chapter Six). She uses as an ex­
ample the Family Group Decision Making ("FGDM") model (p. 142). 
This new program directs child care workers to facilitate a family 
meeting of the extended family of the maltreated child and devise a 
plan for resolution. She notes that, as with. old programs, a big part of 
the problem is measuring success: "Claims for the success of FGDM 
have been based almost entirely on demonstrations that state authori­
ties have deferred to the plans developed by adult family members, 
and that those plans have reduced the number of foster and institu­
tional placements . . .  " (p. 144). Like the old programs, the new pro­
gram measures success by how many children get returned to their 
families, not by how those children are doing. In fact, as Bartholet 
points out, in a program such as FGDM, children are likely to go "un­
represented in the . . .  process" (p. 145). 
One of the great strengths of Bartholet's argument is its identifica­
tion of problems others have not noticed. Many argue that there are 
not enough adoptive parents to go around. She combats that argument 
with the recognition that the states are at fault for not looking harder 
for adoptive parents (p. 181-83). States create so many hurdles against 
adoption that middle and upper class . couples are willing to pay more 
to go overseas to adopt babies just to avoid the red tape (p. 182). Fur­
ther, she recognizes that in today's world, the need for parenting does 
not stop at age eighteen (p. 29). A system designed to turn these chil­
dren out at eighteen without emotional and monetary support is truly 
naive. Even the sitcoms joke that children are returning to "the nest" 
in great numbers these days.10 Higher education takes longer and jobs 
9. "No studies have attempted to assess the risks for children posed by a system that 
pays people to provide parenting, recruiting for the job from among those in dire need, and 
largely excluding from consideration those who can afford to parent children in need with­
out significant state support." P. 88. 
10. See, e.g., Empty Nest NBC 1988-1995 (a story about a widower doctor whose two 
grown daughters take up residence in his house). 
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with real longevity are harder to find without upper-level degrees or 
refined skills. Without aggressive adoption leading to parents who will 
care for these children even as adults, we set the system up for failure. 
These kinds of problems will be present in any system. By acknowl­
edging them, Bartholet demonstrates herself capable of taking the dif­
ficult positions. 
II. AN ALTERNATIVE TO BARTHOLET'S ARGUMENT 
Bartholet has the opportunity in the book Nobody's Children to 
articulate the rights of children at the constitutional level. Yet, while 
her book provides ample support for such an argument, it fails to take 
the last step and actually make it. In the realm of criminal law, some­
times distance from the criminals and their crimes allows appellate 
courts a more objective view of the actual rights involved.11 The oppo­
site may be true in the realm of child abuse and neglect law. Without 
really looking at the kids involved - without really looking at what 
happens to them - it may be impossible for lawyers, judges, and law 
professors to understand the rights involved. Criminals gain rights 
from distance that they might not have without the appellate process. 
Children lose them - or, more appropriately, never got them in the 
first place.12 
This Part first demonstrates how Bartholet's own arguments sup­
port the children's rights approach. This Part then follows with an ex­
planation of why shifting the focus to an argument about rights is a 
better step to take. It finally points out the major shortcomings suf­
fered by Bartholet's approach, acknowledging that these shortcomings 
may be insurmountable by any reform proposal. 
A. A Constitutional Rights Analysis - What 
Bartholet Could Have Said 
In the process of making her explicit argument for more active and 
earlier state intervention, Bartholet repeatedly makes a case for the 
recognition of fundamental constitutional rights for children. Some­
times she even expressly notes the concept. Yet at every step she con­
cludes her sections and chapters weakly and suggests that states 
should do more. This Section demonstrates the stronger conclusion 
11. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (showing that even when the de­
fendant's self-incrimination in a horrific murder of a child was accepted by state courts, fed­
eral appellate courts focused on the criminal procedure principle in finding coercion by the 
police). 
12. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982) ("Even when blood rela­
tionships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruc­
tion of their family life . . . .  When the State moves to destroy weakened family bonds, it must 
provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.") (emphasis added). 
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that Bartholet could have reached and argues why she should have 
gone that far. 
Bartholet highlights the story of Joshua DeShaney, a four-year-old 
boy beaten to the point of severe brain damage by his father when so­
cial services should have known him to be in danger.13 The Court held 
that culpability for Joshua's harm lay solely with his father, and not 
the state. In fact, the Court noted that if the state had removed 
Joshua, it might have been unconstitutionally intruding into the 
parent-child relationship.14 Bartholet notes that even Justice 
Blackmun's impassioned dissent assumed the baseline that a state's 
ability to act would be subordinated to the ultimate parental right.15 
Bartholet criticizes this viewpoint because it fails to hold the state re­
sponsible for protecting children from their parents. She says this 
"shows the family autonomy model at work" (p. 36) , implying that the 
Court's mistake was the presumption that family autonomy is the 
baseline. But, while she admonishes the state for denying direct re­
sponsibility for its children, she gives no real roadmap for achieving 
that goal. She is essentially arguing here that the Supreme Court is just 
wrong. 
Yet here, in the first pillar of her argument that the state should 
take more and earlier responsibility for its children, she also provides 
the support for a riskier argument. What if we were to pit the rights of 
Joshua to be loved and nurtured against the rights of his father to par­
ent him? Bartholet argues for more state responsibility, but has no 
claim of right to force the necessary policies. If the courts recognized 
the child's constitutional right to be free from harm by his parents, or 
to be loved and nurtured by his parents, then the state responsibility 
that Bartholet advocates would not be a political question, but a con­
stitutional one. The policy arguments would then be focused on how 
to fulfill that responsibility and not as they are now on whether the 
state has the right or responsibility to intervene at all. The argument 
made by the Court, that the state could be charged with violating a 
parent's right for removing a child, would lose force in the face of the 
balance with the child's right not to have an abusive parent. The 
problem with DeShaney was that the question was parent versus state, 
not parent versus child. 
Bartholet says that the state should be liable for harm to such a 
child without resort to Justice Blackmun's argument that the state has 
13. This case reached the Supreme Court as a case by Joshua and his mother against the 
State. See De Shaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
14. Id. at 203. 
15. Id. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing for state responsibility based on the 
state's assumption of responsibility by intervening through the child protection program and 
thus giving others the impression that Joshua would be protected, but then not ultimately 
keeping him from harm's way). 
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a responsibility if the state first intervenes (p. 36). But she does not 
give the Court a way to get there. If the child has rights equal to par­
ents, then it is the state's responsibility to protect that right - the 
state does not simply have some nebulous duty to intervene, but a real 
duty to protect the rights of this part of its citizenry.16 
Bartholet could have based 'her argument on the premise that it is 
time to stop seeing children as property of their parents. Actually, she 
does mention it, but she buries it. In this chapter, Bartholet says of the 
Supreme Court: "the rights of biological parents are the starting point 
for analysis, and usually the ending point also: these rights are so pow­
erful that children's rights, or the rights of competing 'social parents,' 
don't count at all unless the biological parents are first demonstrated 
to be unfit" (p. 40). 
Rather than bury this statement as an observation within a chapter 
discussing history and politics, Bartholet could have written a book 
centered on the conclusions this book buries. She could have used the 
same evidence to support the bolder thesis that it is time for a change 
in viewpoint and argued that what is needed is an exploration of the 
contours of the rights involved. The child's right might be a positive 
right to be nurtured and loved, allowing for positive development to­
ward adulthood. Alternatively, it may be a negative right not to be 
stunted in development by abuse or neglect. But that dialogue, should 
it occur, will be long and contentious. So, right now, it would be im­
possible to articulate definite contours or boundaries to the child's 
rights. 
While criticizing the United States Supreme Court for upholding 
the family preservation bias, Bartholet points to Santosky v. Kramer,17 
which mandates a higher burden of proof before a state may terminate 
parental rights. Here, she comes very close to making the argument 
advocated in this Notice. She actually says, "[n]ot surprisingly, in light 
of DeShaney and Santosky, the Court has failed to accord children any 
constitutionally protected rights to be properly parented . . .  " (p. 40). 
But she concludes the chapter, and indeed the rest of the book, with­
out ever making this failure of the Court to recognize children's con­
stitutional rights her central theme. She does not argue, as she could, 
that children would gain power with rights - if not through the politi­
cal process, then through courts. 
In Chapter Five, Bartholet discusses traditional programs, begin­
ning, again, with the concept of family preservation. Again, she notes 
16. Interestingly, children placed in state-regulated foster homes may in fact have a sub­
stantive due process right to personal safety there. See Meador v. Cabinet for Human Res., 
902 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1990). 
17. 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (holding that before a state may sever completely and irrevoca­
bly the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the state support its 
allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence). 
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the dichotomy between parents' and children's rights: "Federal consti­
tutional law requires that states prove maltreatment by 'clear and con­
vincing evidence' . . . .  Federal constitutional law gives adults funda­
mental rights to parent their children, while giving children no rights 
to be parented in a nurturing way" (p. 113). In this chapter, she out­
lines existing programs and the difficulty in changing them because of 
the family preservation mindset. Here she also criticizes race matching 
as a method of community preservation. Yet, again, she concludes 
weakly without actually providing arguments that children should 
have rights. 
Bartholet devotes Chapter Six to arguing that new programs suffer 
the same problems as the old because they follow the same traditional 
ideas - providing herself the ideal opening to argue for a complete 
change in viewpoint. She concludes the chapter with a few weak and 
general sentences about her views on what child protective services 
should be doing,18 but not before emphasizing that, "when children 
have been subjected to severe forms of abuse and neglect, the state 
should not abdicate its responsibility" (p. 146). Bartholet presses for 
more active involvement by the state at every tum, but she has room 
in her argument for the question of why the state has the responsibil­
ity. Asking whose right is in question is a potentially more far reaching 
step than the basic articulation that the state has to do more. Her 
manner of describing FGDM suggests that she believes the lack of 
children's rights to be the major problem with this new proposal,19 yet 
she does not come out and advocate children's rights as the solution. 
She leaves unanchored her call for state responsibility. 
B. What Would Children's Rights Do That 
Bartholet's Solution Does Not? 
With the gaining of their own constitutional rights, children have 
the chance to be taken seriously by scholars of all walks of constitu­
tional theory. Children do not benefit from the full scrutiny of legal 
academy. Their plight is seen as subordinate to the rights of their par­
ents. Family rights are debated, parents' rights are debated, but chil­
dren's rights are ignored (or just not conceptualized). 
As a part of its clinical program, the University of Michigan Law 
School offers a course on child advocacy. On the first day of class, 
Professor Don Duquette says to participants, "I've worked in this field 
18. P. 159 ("[I]t seems likely that children would do better if adoption was established as 
the presumptive placement for all children who could not live with their parents of origin, 
leaving child welfare workers and the courts to choose another form of permanency only on 
the basis of an individualized determination that it would better serve a child's interests."). 
19. P. 146 (criticizing FGDM because "it is about giving parents accused of maltreat­
ment, together with other adult family members, even greater power than they now have 
over the fate of children"). 
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a long time, and there are a lot of really good people with really soft 
hearts who work in this field, but what these kids really need is people 
with soft hearts and hard heads, and that's what I hope you will be for 
them." Part of the problem with this field is that many of the power­
houses of legal thought and advocacy think it a separate and distinct 
area of law that is guided more by family policy than by legal theory. 
There is nothing intellectually challenging in the abstract, because 
there is no abstract conflict of rights.20 
With the reconceptualization of children's rights might come ar­
guments of equal protection,21 substantive due process ("fundamental 
rights"),22 and other such stimulating possibilities for legal scholars. 
Once the rights of children directly conflict with those of parents, the 
academy might take notice. Children's rights should be taken seriously 
by all scholars - in reality and in the abstract.23 
Bartholet does not completely miss (or bury) the point. She de­
scribes children as "hostages" in the political fight over family support 
services (p. 195). She notes "children who are surviving but not thriv-
20. See, e.g., DONALD N. DUQUETIE, MICHIGAN CHILD WELFARE LAW: CHILD 
PROTECTION, FOSTER CARE, TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS, prepared for Michigan 
Family Independence Agency, FIA Publication No. 374 (2000) (acknowledging as a precur­
sor, the one-way flow of rights: "The state can intervene coercively in family life only after 
due process of law. Protective services has very limited authority to override parental wishes 
in conducting its investigation or suggesting services."). 
21. Children would not qualify as a suspect class justifying strict scrutiny under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. But perhaps programs such as FGDM would not seem so auto­
matically rational if the child's right to be raised to his full potential, or loved and nurtured 
was well established. 
22. Parents have long been presumed by the court to have the "fundamental right" to 
control the education and upbringing of their children. "The liberty interest . . .  of parents in 
the care, custody, and control of their children - is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental 
liberty interests recognized by this Court." Troxel v. Granville, 530 US 57, 65-66 (2000) 
(chronicling the history of the Court's decisions in the area of parents' rights to "establish a 
home and bring up children" and "to control the education of their own" and "the funda­
mental liberty interest of natural parents in the are custody and management of their child") 
(citing numerous cases). Disputes over that right have taken the form of how far the state 
may encroach on that right - when a child is a child and how far the parent's right extends 
until it meets the public interest. The opposing interest in these cases is assumed to be the 
public interest, not the child's rights. If children had a fundamental right to be raised without 
maltreatment, however, then the state and the courts in upholding the constitution might 
have a duty beyond simply the public interest. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 (1980) 
("[Q]uite apart from the guarantee of equal protection, if a law 'impinges upon a fundamen­
tal right explicitly or implicitly secured by the Constitution [it] is presumptively unconstitu­
tional.' ") (internal citation omitted). 
23. Ironically, although Guggenheim's review and this Notice take polar opposite ap­
proaches to Bartholet's work, they do agree in similar fashion that her approach is too nar­
row. See Guggenheim, supra note 3, at 1738: 
The abysmal conditions of poverty and despair into which millions of poor children are born 
and are not immutable facts of life. It is essential that we determine the extent to which these 
conditions are caused by factors for which we may hold the larger society accountable and, 
therefore, could improve or eliminate. Nobody's Children fails to consider the extent to 
which these conditions are a product of various social forces influencing American society 
and policy. 
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ing" (p. 204) and reminds the reader that any system based on crisis is 
no help for them. Bartholet uses these middle-ground children as her 
best support for "taking adoption seriously"24 while taking a stand on 
adoption in the book that is in itself a radical proposal. She advocates 
early and aggressive efforts at getting children adopted, and not neces­
sarily by other members of the family or community. Highlighting the 
reality that drug abuse is a disease that takes a long time from which 
to recover, she makes the controversial suggestion that such a long 
time frame may be too long for children to wait - even if the parents 
may eventually recover.25 Finally, she notes that the society needs to 
get beyond conceptions of racism and classism when talking about is­
sues of how to help these children (p. 209). Bartholet does, obviously, 
take some risks with her book, and she fleshes out issues previously 
unnoticed. 
Yet all of these points necessitate a more radical reconceptualiza­
tion of rights. Merely pushing for more child protection money or bet­
ter programs will not address these problems. In order to overcome 
the presumptions already present in constitutional law, children's 
rights would have to be recognized equally. 
Because Bartholet does not take the riskfor Pilth, the solutions she 
offers fall somewhat flat. Over and over, she advocates universal home 
visits for mothers of infants (Chapter Seven). Although she mentions 
the political difficulty of this solution, she does not give it the �)llport it 
will necessarily have. Even the casual political observer will recognize 
that Members of Congress are generally members of the upper-middle 
class. Getting them to vote for a measure that would send a visitor into 
their own homes means probably compromising to the point where 
the visitor would not be much help to a child in danger. Yet instituting 
visitors only for the lower socioeconomic groups demonstrates bald­
faced discrimination even with the statistics to show those children 
more at risk. A reconceptualization of children's rights, however, 
takes the focus off the intrusiveness into the parents' realm and puts it 
on the rights of the children to have some outside assistance. 
Bartholet also proposes universal screening and neonatal testing to 
identify prenatal exposure to illicit drugs or alcohol (p. 222). She envi­
sions reporting and immediate involvement by child protective serv-
24. Pp. 203-04 ("Taking adoption seriously means being willing to remove children even 
if physical safety is not at issue. It means being willing to take action immediately upon re­
moval to terminate parental rights and place children in adoptive homes . . . .  We may be 
moving in this direction, but so far we have taken only the most modest first steps."). 
25. Bartholet also challenges the studies showing that crack babies can grow up nor­
mally. She rightly takes a bigger picture approach and notes that the babies that are hardest 
to care for - malnourished, addicted, premature, low-birth weight - can grow up normally, 
but only with parenting above and beyond the average effort. Yet these children are sent to 
the homes of addicts (or even recovering addicts) - likely people who are not on the upper 
end of the curve in patience, determination, and attentiveness with their newborns. P. 76. 
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ices. Then, drug-exposed infants might be removed from their parents 
at birth and placed on a fast-track for adoption (p. 223). She argues 
forcefully for quicker adoption and more aggressive efforts to find 
adoptive parents (pp. 180-83). If she had taken the position that chil­
dren have a right to this kind of supervision, she may have been able 
to move the debate in a different direction - give it a new focus. 
Thus, the intrusiveness on the parent's right would be balanced with 
the child's right to be raised safely and securely. The political difficul­
ties still exist, but the debate takes a different tone - and maybe 
opens some minds. 
Bartholet acknowledges the risks inherent in arguing as she does, 
and tries to temper the resistance: 
It does seem harsh to take from people who are typically the victims not 
only of their drugs but of difficult, and often tragic, life circumstance, the 
children who may be their only joy and hope. But it is also harsh to con­
demn children to lives ravaged by their parents' substance abuse during 
pregnancy, by maltreatment during their early months at home, and by 
the years spent on hold waiting for their parents to overcome their 
problems." [p. 227] 
She demonstrates, through statements like this one, that she is willing 
to fight back against those who would immediately criticize (with great 
legitimacy) any argument that parents' rights should be balanced with 
those of children. 
Yet if she is willing to go so far, why not take the final step of ad­
vocating the equal rights of children? The entire way of looking at 
children's problems could gain multifaceted depth if it were moved 
from a strongly political issue of parents' rights, discrimination of un­
derclass or minority parents, and details of programs, to a question of 
the application of children's rights, how they are balanced, and 
whether_ they are respected equally with the rights of their parents.26 
C. Some Shortcomings of Both Approaches 
Bartholet's proposed solution in the book is also missing some im­
portant elements. She fails to address the problem of who makes the 
decision of what is best for the child of a failing family and how we 
prepare them to do so; she fails to deal with the political realities of 
radical reform; and she fails to deal adequately with the children in the 
middle - the ones already in the system who will not be affected by 
26. Bartholet does recognize that rights change attitudes: 
Mandatory home visitation does seem like a radical step in today's world. But compulsory 
education laws and childhood labor laws were once seen as radical interventions in the fam­
ily. So were the abuse and neglect laws that took from parents the right they previously had 
to physically brutalize and to sexually violate their children. 
P. 171. 
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reforms that start at the prenatal. But the book is a start, and a much 
needed one at that. 
The most important question in any aggressive child protection 
system will be, who makes the decisions? In both a system that pushes 
for more aggressive early intervention and adoption such as Bartholet 
proposes, and a system that takes a deeper approach based on the 
rights of children, someone will necessarily have to make the hard 
choices at the personal, individual level. 
Currently, foster care and child protective workers enjoy a great 
deal of autonomy in making such choices, but family court judges 
oversee the process. In many states, attorneys are also involved as rep­
resentatives of the children in some capacity.27 Yet, in most cases, all 
of these parties lack the training, time, and resources to make really 
informed, quality judgements. Social workers are at least as underpaid 
as teachers, and the burnout rate is high.28 And comparative judg­
ments between parents and prospective caregivers are difficult, if not 
in some cases impossible, to make without biases entering the pic­
ture.29 
In fact, as Bartholet recognizes, without addressing both problems 
at once, more money may not necessarily help the situation. "In­
creasing the pay of child welfare workers, decreasing their caseloads, 
increasing funds for child protective service investigative or family 
preservation services, and other popular 'reform' proposals, won't 
necessarily improve child welfare at all if the system is sending its 
workers instructions that are systematically biased in a problematic di­
rection" (p. 99). The instructions that the system sends the workers are 
also not necessarily coherent, thus leaving them room for interpreta­
tion based on their own values. Again, because the current system is 
27. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.630 (WEST 2001); 2001 D.C. Stat. § 6-
2101(4); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-17 (1999). 
28. This Notice disagrees with Professor Guggenheim's criticism of Bartholet on this 
point. He discusses Bartholet's argument that "[t)he problem is that the state typically does 
not provide adequate and timely reunification services. Child welfare agencies are notori­
ously underfunded and overburdened. Appropriate services are often unavailable." 
Guggenheim, sup.ra note 3, at 1722 (citing Nobody 's Children, p. 195). He then observes, 
"[t]hese statements contradict Bartholet's earlier assumptions that society has tried every­
thing possible to improve the conditions of poor children who become victims of a dysfunc­
tional foster care system." Id. Guggenheim does not make room for the argument that the 
two are not necessarily internally contradictory. Bartholet practically recognizes that the in­
fusion of resources that would be necessary to remedy the first observation actually leads to 
the second. There is no realistic probability that the political system could do it, so we have 
tried everything within our power. 
29. Carolyn Frantz, Note, Eliminating Consideration of Parental Wealth in Post-Divorce 
Custody Disputes, 99 MICH L. REV. 216, 227-35 (2000) (arguing that biases inherent in the 
consideration of wealth in determining which parent would be a better placement for a child 
militate exclusion of its consideration from the process, and thus suggesting that some biases 
may be impossible to separate from the individual decisionmaker necessitating elimination 
of the factor altogether). 
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predicated on the state versus the parents' rights, many people's value 
systems automatically move them to the side of the parents. The re­
conceptualization of rights suggested in this Notice might change the 
value balance. But qualitative judgments at the ground level will al­
ways be a difficulty of an area of law where the individuals injured are 
not able to speak for themselves. 
Bartholet advocates a radical approach for children of drug abus­
ers and children who have been severely maltreated from birth. But 
she also acknowledges the difficulty with defining neglect (p. 27) - a 
problem that becomes more acute either with Bartholet's call for more 
aggressive action or the children's rights alternative presented here. 
The definitional distinctions will have to be made with great care and 
the discretion given only to those who are well equipped to make such 
weighty calls. The egregious cases are easy under such scenarios; cases 
of neglect are not. The neglect determination brings the question of 
who makes the decision at the ground level into sharper relief. If chil­
dren have a right to be raised in a nurturing environment, where do 
we draw the line? And what will be the impact of cultural differences? 
These questions have arisen in this context before - for instance, 
whether spanking is appropriate as a punishment or teaching tool or 
whether it constitutes abuse. But if the more aggressive state interven­
tion Bartholet advocates comes to pass, or if the conception of chil­
dren's rights changes as the stakes get higher, these fine distinctions 
will need to be thoroughly debated. 
Neither Bartholet's solution nor a reconceptualization of rights 
overcomes another series of roadblocks: children cannot lobby; they 
do not make political contributions; and they do not vote. In Chapter 
Six, Bartholet recounts the broad support the Multiethnic Placement 
Act of 1994 ("MEPA") and MEPA II enjoyed in Congress (p. 129-33). 
This legislation forbids states from considering race as a factor in child 
placement. She even acknowledges the role that Senator Metzenbaum 
played in the legislation. She admires his interest in the topic and sees 
the Congress's interest as significant (pp. 130-31). But she does not 
seem to recognize that with a Senator as well-respected as 
Metzenbaum was, many of the other Members probably supported the 
bill because it was important to him, not because the topic had finally 
been acknowledged. Without such a supporter, how will the topic gain 
notoriety? This is a problem that children's issues have faced for years. 
Bartholet herself acknowledges it elsewhere in the book: "People talk 
of a children's rights movement. But the brutal truth is that children 
are economically and politically powerless. They are dependent on 
adults, and adult political groups have generally not taken up their 
cause" (p. 50). 
Finally, the children caught in the middle deserve a great deal of 
attention once any framework for discourse over children's rights is 
established. Even with perfect new programs that begin during preg-
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nancy and catch falling children just as they begin to fall, there will al­
ways be children who entered the world, or the system, before the new 
program was established. No conscious advocate would be willing to 
write off these children, but they are, in many cases, the hardest with 
which to deal. Bartholet does not propose any real solutions to the 
children who are already too old for adoption, or who have been so 
damaged by continued efforts at reunification that parenting would 
take extraordinary effort. 
III. THE BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF A CHILD RIGHTS Focus 
Lack of interest, political drive, and intellectual curiosity are not 
unique to child abuse and neglect law. They are pervasive in all types 
of law dealing with children. In education law, for instance, one mem­
ber of Congress, himself a former teacher, rep�atedly reminds us in 
speeches about education and school choice proposals that "what we 
are proposing is a widespread experiment in the lives of real chil­
dren. "30 His statement is always true when legislators, politicians, and 
judges divorce themselves from the reality that their decisions will im­
pact the children already in the system as much or more than the chil­
dren they are attempting to help by reforming prospectively. Again, 
distance does a disservice to children. Recognizing the rights of chil­
dren would involve a change in conceptualization of more problems 
than just child abuse and neglect. All areas of law dealing with chil-
dren could be seen from a new viewpoint. 
· 
The debate over education laws in this country could be dramati­
cally changed in focus and scope if the government were forced to 
grapple with more than just the political pitfalls of poor education sys­
tems. Children gained the right to be educated equally in nonsegre­
gated environments years ago.31 Yet children currently do not hold a 
constitutionally protected right to an adequate education.32 Radical re­
conceptualization of children's rights might change the tone of debate 
over public education, school choice, and major education programs. 
Rather than arguing over parents' rights to "send" children to certain 
schools, the debate could be refocused onto the. child's right to be edu­
cated to a certain standard. Jonathan Kozol's work in the bringing the 
plight of poor school districts to light would take on a new force.33 
30. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. H2654-55 (daily ed. April 30, 1998) (statement of Rep. 
Sawyer). 
· 
31. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
32. For instance, Jonathan Kozol observes that "the state, by requiring attendance but 
refusing to require equity, effectively requires inequality. Compulsory inequity, perpetuated 
by state law, too frequently condemns our children to unequal lives." JONATHAN KOZOL, 
SAVAGE INEQUALITIES 56 (1991). 
33. Id. 
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Children would have the right not to be forced to attend schools 
where plumbing does not exist, or ceilings fall in.34 
The rights of children could force the school choice debate to ac­
knowledge the problem of children who do not receive vouchers, or 
whose parents do not apply for them.35 If their rights became the fo­
cus, would Members of Congress continue to quibble over the political 
question of vouchers? Or would they begin to look for much larger, 
more radical approaches to reform of the whole system? Would they 
realize that even if vouchers cause gradual change in public education, 
children already in those schools cannot afford to wait for that change 
to occur? 
The laws of evidence are a good example of a way even the legal 
establishment diminishes the rights of children. In a story of the hor­
rors faced by a young boy during attempts to reunify him with his 
mother, Bartholet recounts that "he and his brother both accused their 
mother of abuse" (p. 107). This is not a new tale. Children make alle­
gations of abuse. But the evidentiary system has grown up with the 
rights only of parents in mind, not of their children. Thus, it is inflexi­
ble to the special problems of children testifying. Yes, children are dif­
ferent. Questions arise as to their ability to testify in a truthful man­
ner.36 Children can be more susceptible to suggestion if interviewed 
without special care.37 Testifying in court can, for them, be a traumatic 
experience in its own right.38 Yet without their testimony, prosecutors 
are often at a disadvantage in proving what would be a cut and dry 
case of assault between two adults. The laws are beginning to change 
in some places.39 But if children's rights were recognized as equal to 
their parents', courts would have to create methods that allow them to 
have their day in court. Interviewing techniques that are tailored to 
children could become standardized; in camera sessions with judges 
(rather than open-court testimony) could become standard practice; 
34. See id. at 26, 106. 
35. For instance, as Kozol observes, " [t]he poorest parents, often the products of infe­
rior education, lack the information access and the skills of navigation in an often hostile and 
intimidating situation to channel their children to the better schools, obtain the applications, 
and . . .  help them to get ready for the necessary tests and then persuade their elementary 
schools to recommend them." Id. at 60. 
36. See RICHARD D. FRIEDMAN, THE ELEMENTS OF EVIDENCE 71 (2d ed. 1998) (re­
viewing the history of child testimony and the competency requirement and recognizing that 
recent trends have been toward weakening and eliminating competency requirements for 
child witnesses). 
37. See, e.g., State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1376-79 (N.J. 1994) (cataloguing interview 
errors in highly publicized child sexual abuse case). 
38. See JOHN E.B. MYERS, 2 EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES § 6.2 
(3d ed. 1997) (reviewing research on effects on children of testimony in child abuse cases). 
39. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 36, at 71. 
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and judges and attorneys could be educated in recent research on the 
truthfulness of child testimony.40 
As the fledgling ideas in this Section demonstrate, a new debate 
about the inherent rights of children - positive or negative - has the 
potential to change the way we talk about a whole host of policies and 
programs dealing with children. Perhaps it is time to start looking at 
the field of children's rights as one coherent field rather than a policy 
problem common to many. 
CONCLUSION 
As Bartholet says in her Introduction: 
This book is . . .  about the culture that makes it possible to see children 
as Nobody's, or Somebody Else's, and certainly Not Ours. It tells the 
story of how our child welfare policies came to place such a high value on 
keeping children in their families and communities of origin without re­
gard to whether this works for children. [p. 2] 
This book recognizes what most people find too difficult to face: some 
of this country's children need radical intervention - their parents are 
not fit and, without extraordinary measures, will not be made so. The 
problem with Bartholet's approach, however, is that she has articu­
lated no anchor in constitutional rights for the reforms she proposes. 
Without one, the easy counterargument to all of her proposals is that 
parents' rights should be respected, and she is just a radical who wants 
the state to control family life. This Notice has sought to demonstrate 
that Bartholet does not have to subject herself to that kind of minimi­
zation. 
On an even more fundamental level, shifting the focus to the rights 
of children might force this debate out into the light. The children for 
whom Bartholet and her colleagues advocate are not the type whose 
rights are normally a topic of open debate. No one wants to break up 
loving families because of differences of opinion over proper methods 
in raising children. But because of that risk, many people are too 
afraid even to broach the issue. A recent presidential debate demon­
strates the problem: 
MEMBER OF AUDIENCE: I've heard a lot about education and the 
need to hold teachers and schools accountable . . . .  But . . .  I have seen a 
lot of instances where the parents are unresponsive to the teachers or flat 
out uninvolved in their child's education. How do you intend to not only 
hold the teachers and schools accountable but also hold parents respon­
sible? 
40. See MYERS, supra note 38, at 12 ("When the witness is a child, the assumption that 
traditional courtroom procedures elicit the most complete and reliable testimony is open to 
question. This is not to say, however, that traditional procedures should be abandoned. With 
relatively minor adjustments, most children can testify. Making room for children does not 
necessitate reinventing the legal wheel. Just add training wheels."). 
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BUSH: Well, you know, it's hard to make people love one another. I 
wish I knew the law because I would darn sure sign it. . . .  I happened to 
believe strong accountability encourages parental involvement, though. I 
think when you measure and post results on the Internet or in the town 
newspapers, most parents say wait a minute . . . .  
GORE: . . .  I'd like to start by telling you what my vision is. I see a day in 
the United States of America where all of our public schools are consid­
ered excellent, world class. Where there are no failing schools, where the 
classrooms are small enough in size . . . .  Governor Bush is for vouchers, 
and in his plan he proposes to drain more money, more taxpayer money 
out of the public schools for private school vouchers . . . . 41 
"How do you intend to . . .  hold parents responsible?" was the 
question. This question was, at least in part, about the children 
Bartholet champions - the ones who have no chance of turning back 
time and regaining their lost prenatal care, nurturing in infancy and 
active teaching in early childhood. And both candidates quickly 
moved into realms of child advocacy for which they had ready an­
swers. But these kids will not be helped by the programs that win 
presidential campaigns, and they should never be used as a spring­
board for a canned political message. These are the kids no one talks 
about. Maybe it's because there are no good answers for them. Maybe 
it's because they aren't an intellectually challenging topic. Or maybe 
it's because no one really knows how to help them. However difficult 
it may be to talk about a distressing problem for which there are no 
politically or intellectually sound solutions, it is time to start. 
41. Debate Transcripts: 2000 Debates, at http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2000c.html 
(Oct. 17, 2000). 
